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Abstract
This article argues that the content of the legal term “peaceful purposes,”as used in internatio-
nal space law is changing.  Peaceful Purposes as understood throughout the bulk of the Space 
Age has encompassed not only the UN Charter’s prohibitions on the use of force, but also a 
number of customary international law principles that enhanced it beyond mere non-aggression. 
Through an examination of state practice with regards to the military uses of outer space, this 
article concludes that the legal content of peaceful purposes is eroding towards an alignment 
with “non-aggressive” as understood in the law concerning the use of force.  Specifically, this 
article argues that geopolitical and technological changes are encouraging states to pursue 
disruption in the space environment rather than stability, and this has been matched with state 
practice and rhetoric that exhibits that states are moving toward more offensive, rather than 
defensive, stances in the space environment.
Keywords : aggression, customary international law, peaceful purposes, space law, space se-
curity
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I. INTRODUCTION
A foundational legal concept in the use and exploration of outer space is 
that it should be for peaceful purposes.  Although the notion of peaceful uses 
is almost universally held as a threshold legal requirement for space activities 
by space actors, the term lacks any clear definition.  This is problematic as the 
content of the term is continually shifting as states develop new understand-
ings of their own relationship to space security and overtime reinterpret the 
legal obligation.  Thus, while the legal terminology is static the underlying 
politics reveals dynamic changes in how states understand their international 
obligations.  
This paper will investigate how states currently understand the obligation 
to use space for peaceful purposes, and trace observation points that reveal the 
shifting notions of space security that affect the content of the legal obligation. 
Specifically, this paper will argue that the legal content of peaceful purposes 
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has been gradually eroding towards a legal minimum of non-aggressive uses 
of outer space within the context of contemporary geopolitics.  It will argue 
that state rhetoric and actions, such as the US Space Force proposal and In-
dia’s ASAT test, indicate that the term peaceful purposes is expanding to allow 
new classes of activities to fall within its legal bounds.  Finally, this paper will 
discuss how changes in space technology will continue to create challenges 
for this bedrock principle.
This paper will proceed by first identifying the legal sources of the term 
‘peaceful uses’/’peaceful purposes’ and the historical development of the 
term’s legal content.  Next, this paper will investigate contemporary trends 
in space security that impact the peaceful purposes obligation and determine 
whether these trends point to an erosion of the limits imposed by the obliga-
tion.  Finally, this paper will look at the future challenges posed to the obliga-
tion in light of emerging technologies that undermine assumptions underlying 
an expanded scope of peaceful purposes.
II. THE OBLIGATION OF PEACEFUL USES
From the inception of the space age in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik I, 
space has been deemed to be used for “peaceful purposes” by states.  The term 
makes its first appearance in the international fora in UN General Assembly 
resolution 1348 (XIII): Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space of 1958, 
which was the first General Assembly resolution to address space activities by 
states.1  Since this time “peaceful uses” or “peaceful purposes” has become a 
threshold requirement for states engaging in space activities.  This section will 
briefly sketch the development of the term and its legal content in the space 
domain.
 Though peaceful uses emerge at the very beginning of the space age 
as a legal limitation of the space activities of states, it has never been codified 
as a treaty term applicable to all of outer space.  The Outer Space Treaty of 
1967 uses the phrase in the Preamble, but only operationalizes the term in 
Art. IV, with regards to the moon and other celestial bodies which “shall be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes.”2  Even though states were unwilling 
to operationalize the term as applicable to all of space through positive treaty 
law, this has not excluded peaceful purposes as a legal obligation under the 
1  UN General Assembly, Resolution 1348 (XIII): Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (13 Dec. 
1958) 
2  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Article IV, 610 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 October 1967) 
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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international legal framework governing outer space. Indeed, the term has 
arguably become a type of grundnorm for outer space activities by states. 
Whether or not a space activity is for peaceful purposes is the threshold 
question for determining the legality of any space activity, and those activities 
that are not for peaceful purposes are de facto illegal.  This is, of course, an 
interesting situation since the Outer Space Treaty functions as a “constitution” 
for space, yet it never codifies the central legal requirement for space activities. 
This situation spawns from the Cold War genesis of space law.
The launch of Sputnik I dramatically changed the dynamics of international 
peace and security by exhibiting technologies that would be used to develop 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and technology that would facilitate 
space-based surveillance of other states.  Recognizing the risk that Cold War 
conflict extended to space posed for itself and the international community 
the United States sought early to deploy a norm of “peaceful purposes” as 
applicable to space activities.  Indeed, the United States insisted on making 
its first space launch a civilian launch rather than a military one, which in turn 
led to the Soviet Union “winning” the race to orbit an artificial satellite first.3 
Further, the phrase was included in the first US legislation on space, passed 
in 1958, which required the newly formed National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) to use space for peaceful purposes.4 As already noted 
this term then found its way into the development of the international legal 
framework, significantly in UN General Assembly Resolution 1962(XVIII), 
which represented the international community’s first attempt at defining 
the basic legal principles that would govern outer space.  This resolution 
incorporated the idea of peaceful purposes into its perambulatory text  
“Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”5
Despite the lack of the term’s use inoperative language in either Resolu-
tion 1962(XVIII) or the Outer Space Treaty, it is widely recognized by states 
as a legal norm that applies to states.  It is consistently included in UN General 
Assembly resolutions regarding space,6 it lends itself to the main UN body 
3  Memo on Sputnik. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, October 8, 1957, National 
Archives..
4  National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, §102(a), codified at 51 U.S.C. §20102 (2019).
5  United Nations General Assembly, (December 13, 1963), Resolution 1962 (XVIII): Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.
6  For example, Resolution 73/91. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space (2018); 
73/72. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (2018); Resolution 
73/72,Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (2018); Resolution 73/30, 
Prevention of an arms race in outer space (2018); and Resolution 73/6. Fiftieth anniversary of the first 
United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: space as a driver of 
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dealing with space issues – The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), and is consistently referred to by states 
when describing their  space activities.  Two salient examples of this can be 
found in the cases of Iran and North Korea.  Both of these states used their 
right to engage in peaceful uses of outer space to defend their space programs 
when these programs were criticized by the international community as mis-
sile development programs.7 As this author has argued in depth elsewhere, the 
term has force as customary international law supported by widespread opinio 
juris by states.8
What, then, is to be made of the decision not to operationalize the norm 
through treaty text?  It seems as though, the language of Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty which reserves the Moon and other celestial bodies “exclusively 
for peaceful purposes” would undercut claims of the customary nature of the 
norm as applied to all of outer space.  In other words, this argument claims 
that by acknowledging its applicability to celestial bodies, the state parties to 
the treaty have excluded the void of space from the scope of the norm.  This 
interpretation would stand in opposition to the clear opinio juris expressed by 
states.  Instead, it must be taken into account that the norm as used in the treaty 
is different than the customary norm that emerged at the beginning of the 
space age.  In the treaty text, peaceful purposes on the Moon and other celes-
tial bodies are defined as explicitly non-military, as the article states that “[t]he 
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of 
any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bod-
ies shall be forbidden.”9  ‘Peaceful purposes’ as applied to the Moon and other 
celestial bodies tracks with the norm’s usage in the Antarctic Treaty, which 
also defines peaceful purposes as non-militarized,10 but it does not track with 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which fails to define 
the term in the face of widespread military uses of the high seas. As a result, 
we can see that “peaceful purposes” can have different meanings in different 
contexts.11 When it is used in a treaty’s text it is defined by that treaty, but the 
content of a customary norm will largely be defined by the state practice that 
sustainable development (2018).
7 See Kevjn Lim & Gil Baram, “Iran Is Mastering the Final Frontier,” Foreign Policy, (14 March 2019) 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/14/iran-is-mastering-the-final-frontier/ and P. J. Blount, “Developments 
in Space Security and Their Legal Implications,” Law/Technology 44 (2011): 35-39
8 See P. J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the Law of War Into the Corpus Juris Spa-
tialis,” in Proceedings of the 51st Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2009); “Space Security Law,” 
in Oxford Encyclopedia of Interplanetary Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), https://oxfor-
dre.com/planetaryscience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190647926.001.0001/acrefore-9780190647926-e-
73#acrefore-9780190647926-e-73-bibItem-0071 
9  Outer Space Treaty, Art. IV.
10  Antarctic Treaty, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force 23 June 1961), Art. I. 
11 See Blount, “Space Security Law”
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underlies that norm.
This, then, brings us directly to the content of the obligation itself. During 
the early days of the space age both the United States and the USSR, at dif-
ferent times, argued that peaceful purposes should mean non-militarized.  The 
United States abandoned this position when it recognized the ability that sur-
veillance satellites would have to reveal information about the Soviet Union’s 
armaments.12  The Soviets, on the other hand, maintained the position until 
they had developed comparable technology,13 and the militaries from these 
two states were both prominent early users of space.  Since militaries may use 
space, one might then reckon “peaceful” to be based on the UN Charter use 
of the word “peace” which means, in short, non-aggressive. Under the UN 
Charter, non-aggressive means that defensive military activities are permitted, 
including defensive weapons.14  
During the Cold War, a more nuanced view prevailed in which “peaceful 
purposes” meant something in between non-militarized and nonaggressive. 
There was at least some customary content to the norm that created a situa-
tion in which the two diametrically opposed superpowers could widely agree 
that weaponizing space was not a useful, practical, or desired endeavor.15 This 
author has argued before that the customary content of peaceful purposes has 
been non-aggressive uses plus the content of the Principles enumerated in the 
UNGA Resolution 1962 (XVIII) Declaration of Legal Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.16 This, 
of course, does not mean that these states did not ever pursue technologies 
that could be described as space weapons, but instead, that space was treated 
in whole more cooperatively and, in this author’s words, as a “multilateral 
commons.”17
However, it must be admitted that the interpretation of peaceful purposes 
as simply non-aggressive, is a valid interpretation of the term as a floor for the 
lowest minimum requirements to be compliant with UN Charter law.  Thus, if 
we can accept that legal interpretations can change over time, the question be-
comes whether in the contemporary setting the meaning of peaceful purposes 
is bending more towards that minimum of non-aggressive.  This is what the 
next section will address.
12 Ibid.
13  James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Inter-
ests (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2008) 92-93, 125.
14  The bounds of peace are found between UN Charter, Art. 2(4) and Art. 51.
15  See Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, ch. 2
16  See Blount, “Space Security Law.” 
17  See Blount, “Innovating the Law: Fifty Years of the Outer Space Treaty,” in Innovation in Outer Space: 
International and African Perspectives, Mahulena Hofmann & P.J. Blount, eds. (Nomos 2018).
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III. WINDS OF CHANGE 
In 1986, the United States and the Soviet Union settled into a voluntary 
moratorium on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon testing.18 The two superpowers 
- without a treaty, without an explicit political agreement, and without a nego-
tiation - mutually decided that ASAT testing was counterproductive and that 
it threatened the space environment as a whole.19  Around the same time, the 
earliest concern with issues of space debris was entering the discourse of the 
space community.20 Based on a variety of factors such as the environmental 
effects, the lack of perceived strategic advantage, and the cost of an effective 
system, the two superpowers ceased testing kinetic ASAT technology. This 
is indicative of the approach to space security during the Cold War, wherein 
the superpowers held back their  development of weapons systems in favor of 
a more safe and secure space environment.  As a result, throughout the Cold 
War, there is acceptance of the use of outer space for passive military activities 
(e.g. the use of space for command and control or reconnaissance), but not for 
activities that extended to  weaponization of outer space.  
It is state practice such as this that is cited to indicate that peaceful pur-
poses in the outer space context have heightened content that goes beyond 
non-aggressive. Unfortunately, such an interpretation is difficult to maintain 
in the contemporary geopolitical climate. The voluntary moratorium on ASAT 
development crumbled in 2007 with a Chinese ASAT test.21  This was fol-
lowed by a reciprocal showing by the United States in 2008,22 and in 2019, 
India also successfully tested a ground to space ASAT.  Significantly, after the 
Indian ASAT, Prime Minister Modi characterized the test as one that brought 
India into an elite status of nations:
Today March 27, a short while ago, India has achieved a remarkable suc-
cess. India has today established itself as a global space power. So far only 
three countries in the world - USA, Russia and China had this capability. To-
day, India has become the fourth country to acquire this status as a space 
power. There can be no bigger moment of pride for every Indian than this.23
It is, of course striking that President Modi claims that this ASAT test is 
18  Laura Grego, “A History of Anti-satellite Programs,” (Union of Concerned Scientists 2012) https://www.
ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf2012)
19 Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 202.
20  Ibid., 220.
21 Grego, “A History of Anti-satellite Programs,”  13.
22 P. J. Blount and Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, eds., USA-193: Selected Documents (National Center for 
Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law, 2009).
23 “Mission Shakti: Read PM Narendra Modi’s full speech announcing how India took down satellite,” 
India Today, (27 March 2019) https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/mission-shakti-narendra-modi-full-
speech-1487838-2019-03-27.
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what allowed India to become a “space power,” rather than India’s highly 
competitive PSLV launch system and planetary exploration initiatives.  This is 
especially so, because during the Cold War it was civil successes in space that 
indicated a “space power” rather than military successes in space.
 In addition to this new string of ASAT tests, the concept of a “space 
force” has emerged. Specifically, the United States has used extensive rheto-
ric around the development of a Space Force as a branch of the military and 
re-established US Space Command. Under the Trump administration, the US 
Department of Defense (USDoD) has acknowledged space as a warfighting 
domain.24 Then during the signing of Space Policy Directive 3, a directive on 
space traffic management that emphasizes international cooperation, Presi-
dent Trump unexpectedly instructed USDoD to establish a Space Force as a 
sixth branch of the US military, stating “[w]e must have American dominance 
in space.”25 President Trump followed this instruction with Space Policy Di-
rective 4 on the establishment of such a force. During the signing of this direc-
tive, he noted that space is “going to be a very big part of where the defense 
of our nation -- and you could say ‘offense’ -- but let’s just be nice about it 
and let’s say the defense of our nation is going to be.”26 His nod to offensive 
weapons in the space domain is substantiated in the text of the directive itself 
which states, “[t[he United States Space Force should include both combat 
and combat support functions to enable prompt and sustained offensive and 
defensive space operations, and joint operations in all domains.”27 As a first 
step to the establishment of  U.S. Space Force, the administration restablished 
Space Command (SPACECOM) as a combatant command of the U.S. mili-
tary.  At the ceremony for the reestablishment of SPACECOM, Trump echoed 
earlier language stating that “SPACECOM will ensure that America’s domi-
nance in space is never questioned and never threatened because we know the 
best way to prevent conflict is to prepare for victory.”28  The Space Force itself 
was established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
24 C. Todd Lopez, “Shanahan: Space No Longer Peaceful” (U.S. Department of Defense, 9 April 2019) 
https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1810085/shanahan-space-no-longer-peaceful/
25 Marcia Smith, “Trump Upstages SPD-3 With Space Force Announcement,” Space Policy Online (18 June 
2018) https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/trump-upstages-spd-3-with-space-force-announcement/
26 Remarks by President Trump at Signing Ceremony for Space Policy Directive-4 (19 February 2019) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-ceremony-space-poli-
cy-directive-4/
27 Space Policy Directive-4: Establishment of the United States Space Force (19 February 2019) https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/text-space-policy-directive-4-establishment-united-states-
space-force/





2020 and will be stood up over the year 2020.29
Lest one think that this is isolated to the US, France has also recently 
deployed a new military division within its Air Force dedicated to space 
operations.30 While France’s President Macron did not echo the rhetoric of 
President Trump, French Defense Minister Florence Parly stated that it would 
deploy weapons on its satellites to defend them including lasers and machine 
guns.31 The United Kingdom has also discussed enhancing its military space 
role noting that the Ministry of Defense is “preparing for a space war within 
the next 15 years.32 Most recently, Japan has also announced that it will de-
velop a ”space defense force,” though the rhetoric surrounding Japan’s plans 
is much more measured.33  It should be clear that the establishment of a Space 
Force does not violate international law, but the signaling that is used in the 
rhetoric surrounding such actions indicates that states are engaging in a new 
pugilistic approach to space, which has consequences for the stability of the 
term peaceful purposes.   
In international fora there has been limited to no movement towards bol-
stering space security.  The Conference on Disarmament remains deadlocked 
and unable to take forward its Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
(PAROS) agenda item.34 In 2014, the European Union’s attempts at negotiat-
ing a code of conduct for space activities failed based primarily on opposition 
from Russia and China, but there was also a significant debate on the inclusion 
or exclusion of the right to self-defense in the code. Significantly, the debate 
over the inclusion of the right to self-defense, was not a legal one as the EU 
Code of Conduct was intended to be a political agreement and nonbinding.  As 
a result, it could not change a state’s legal right to self-defense.35 Instead, those 
that were in opposition seemed to think that the inclusion of the term would be 
29  Public Law No. 116-92 (20 Dec. 2019) Chap. 908.
30 “Macron announces creation of French space force,” France 24 (13 July 2019) https://www.france24.
com/en/20190713-macron-france-space-force
31 Tom McKay, “France Announces Plan to Launch Satellites With Defensive Lasers, Possibly Submachine 
Guns,” Gizmodo (28 July 2019) https://gizmodo.com/france-announces-plan-to-launch-satellites-with-
defensi-1836776429
32 Sarah Knapton, “Ministry of Defence preparing for space war within the next 15 years,” The Telegraph 
(27 Sept. 2019) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2019/09/27/ministry-defence-preparing-space-war-
within-next-15-years/
33 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan to set up its own space force,” The Australian (20 Jan. 2020) https://www.
theaustralian.com.au/world/japan-to-set-up-its-own-space-force/news-story/9a005c0707953584e94539be
2ea8813f
34 United Nations, “At Crossroads on How to Overcome Disarmament Machinery Deadlock, First Commit-
tee Delegates Debate Paths towards Revitalization,” (25 October 2017) https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/
gadis3588.doc.htm
35 See P. J. Blount, “Sorting Out Self-Defence in Space: Understanding the Conflicting Views on Self-
Defence in the EU Code of Conduct,” in Conflicts in Space and the Rule of Law, ed. Maria Manoli and 
Sandy Belle Habachi (Montreal: McGill University, 2017).
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used to justify actions that could deny access to space.36 In 2019, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly’s Group of Governmental experts failed to adopt a report when 
the United States broke consensus.  Even in the aftermath of the Indian ASAT 
test there seemed to be little to no outcry or attempts at ‘naming and shaming.’
In short, as a disarmament expert put it, “it’s really difficult to say that we 
are not currently in an arms race in outer space.”37  This is indeed problem-
atic for arguments that assert that the legal content of peaceful purposes is 
“non-aggressive plus.”  Each of these actions toward weaponization and the 
matching inaction within the international community lends itself towards the 
erosion of the content of the principle of peaceful purposes.
At the moment, it is still unclear to what extent the legal content of peace-
ful purposes has been lowered towards the baseline of nonaggressive, but it is 
submitted here that the legal content of the term has changed dramatically in 
the 21st century from its Cold War meaning.  Despite the rhetoric of states, it 
seems that we are still short of deployed weapons in the space environment, 
but in a realm where there are active direct ascent ASAT systems.  A simple 
perusal of the Secure World Foundation’s Counter Space Report will reveal 
that states have developed a variety of ways to interfere and deny adversar-
ies the benefits of space assets, and the development of these technologies 
indicates these state’s willingness to use these capabilities in times of crisis. 
Further, it is anticipated that unless states take action to reverse this process 
through both political and legal mechanisms, peaceful purposes will continue 
to erode further towards non-aggressive.  This is in part due to the traditional 
ambiguity of the space environment and the emergence of disruptive tech-
nologies in the space domain addressed in the next section.
IV. DISRUPTION AND CONFLICT 
The idea of “disruptive technologies” emerged as buzz words to describe 
much of the technological boom emanating from Silicon Valley.  Disruptive 
technologies upset the status quo by shifting markets and changing industry 
expectations.  The term has taken hold in the space industry to describe a slew 
of newspace companies that are leveraging smallsats and big data to disrupt 
the traditional space industry.38 The problem with the idea of disruptiveness in 
36  Ibid..
37 Conversation with the Daniel Porras of UNIDIR (August 2019). See also Benjamin Silverstein, Daniel 
Porras, and John Borrie, Alternative Approaches and Indicators for the Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space (UNIDIR 2020)
38  See for instance P.J. Blount “Report on the Symposium,” in Proceedings of the International Institute 
of Space Law 2013, Tanja Masson-Zwaan and Rafael Moro-Aguilar, eds. (Eleven International Publishing 
2014), 745-748 (reporting on the 8th Eilene Galloway Symposium on Critical Issues in Space Law: Disrup-
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space is that the status quo in space is not just a concern of industry and com-
mercial interests.  It is also, arguably primarily, an interest of military actors, 
and disruption of the status quo may consequently mean disruption of strate-
gic stability.  This section will argue that many new commercial developments 
threaten to disrupt space security. While many of these technologies are also 
exciting advancements with the potential to change how we use space for the 
better, without international cooperation on implementation these technolo-
gies could lead to further erosion of the term peaceful purposes.  Specifically, 
this section will examine proximity and rendezvous operations, cyber opera-
tions, and large constellations.
Before turning to specific technologies, it is prudent to first discuss one of 
the reigning attributes of the space environment: ambiguity.  It is very difficult 
to know with great precision what is in orbit and where it is exactly at any 
given time.  The first issue, knowing what is in orbit, is difficult because while 
states are legally required to register their payloads, the practice of registra-
tion is uneven and the information that must be shared is de minimis.39 Some 
launched items never get registered, and the descriptions of others are so gen-
eral as to qualify them as any type of satellite.  Additionally, though observing 
the satellite can shed light on operational parameters that inform about its use, 
such observation is hardly dispositive as most satellites will essentially appear 
as points of light in optical sensors.  The second issue is that even the orbital 
parameters that observation reveals are estimates based on data from repeated 
measurement of a space object from Earth being processed using modeling al-
gorithms.  Different models result in different outcomes, and there is a general 
misunderstanding as to what extent we know or can know what a satellite is 
doing in real-time. In a sense, its as if a race track is being observed only at a 
single point to construct a model of the entire race. In real terms, and this is 
a bit scary, a state could place a satellite in orbit and tell the world it was an 
Earth Observation satellite, and it could instead be a nuclear weapon, which 
is illegal under the Outer Space Treaty but with a low possibility of verifica-
tion of compliance.40  This action would go unnoticed until the owner of the 
weapon chose to reveal its true nature because direct observation of spacecraft 
can only reveal so much about the nature of the object.  To date, it is believed 
that this would be unlikely to have happened, but that assumption is based on 
strong buy-in by states to the norm of not placing nuclear weapons on orbit. 
Ambiguity is matched though with the laws of physics, which have tradi-
tive (Game Changing) Space Technologies, Laws and Policies, December 2013).
39  See Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space, Art. IV, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (Novem-
ber 12, 1974).
40  Outer Space Treaty, Art. IV.
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tionally served to limit the efficacy of certain space technologies.41  For exam-
ple, kinetic attacks would likely be extremely disfavored by any of the space 
powers because of the debris that such attacks result in. Similarly, kinetic 
weapons targeting the earth from orbit rely on massive constellations of satel-
lites to be effective and that in the past have been prohibitively expensive due 
to the size and number of the required satellites.  The law of physics also im-
bues space with a certain amount of transparency despite its ambiguousness. 
Though it is hard to definitively say what something is in space and exactly 
where it is, we can for certain see that it is there and develop an understanding 
of its overall behavior.  So, in the case of space-based kinetic weapons, the 
launch of a large classified military constellation would have been observ-
able behavior that is out of the ordinary and likely to raise suspicions of other 
states.  The new technologies addressed below, serve to undermine the as-
sumptions of the physical constraints of satellites, which in turn challenges the 
foundational technical understandings that underpin the obligation of peaceful 
purposes.
A. PROXIMITY AND RENDEZVOUS OPERATIONS
 The first technology to be addressed is proximity and rendezvous op-
erations.  These are operations that are intended to maneuver into the proxim-
ity of another satellite for observation or to rendezvous with and take hold of 
another satellite for repair or other reasons. This has long been militarily in-
teresting technology, but such operations were too cost heavy in terms of fuel 
to make practical.  But as an example, this was one of the capabilities of the 
US Space Shuttle, which using the robotic arm could manipulate a satellite for 
servicing. At the UN, Russia argued that this was an ASAT weapon.42  More 
recently, the United States has been displaying its development of maneuver-
ability with its X-37B project,43 and Russia has been noted to be engaging in 
proximity operations as well.44  These more recent displays are powered by 
changes in propulsion technologies and satellite size that make such maneu-
vers less costly. The interest of militaries in this technology is matched by a 
number of commercial interests that want to engage in Active Debris Removal 
(ADR) and On-Orbit Servicing (OOS) operations.  Both of these technologies 
require one spacecraft to approach and engage physically with another space-
craft, and these technologies hold significant promise for making space opera-
41  See generally, David Wright, Laura Grego & Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Refer-
ence Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005).
42  Moltz, Politics of Space Security, 197.
43  Kiona Smith-Strickland, “What’s the X-37 Doing Up There?,” Air & Space Magazine (March 2016).




tions safer and more resilient.  However, when a commercial company based 
in a particular state has developed this tool, it should be understood that the 
state has essentially also gained this capability. This could be used as an ASAT 
weapon that has the ability to function with low to no space debris creation. 
While domestic law will place limitations on a state’s ability to directly co-opt 
that technology, it will most certainly become part of other state’s strategic 
understanding of that state’s capabilities.
B.CYBERSPACE
Second, Cyber operations pose a challenge because they undermine the 
transparency of space by adding another element of ambiguity.  One of the ef-
fects of the transparency of space is that, if a state has access to sufficient sen-
sors, it is relatively easy to determine where an attack might have originated. 
Cyber operations allow for a malicious attack on a satellite with the possibility 
of avoiding attribution for the attack.45  Cyberspace gives states the ability to 
take action and then assert plausible deniability if blamed for the attack or 
even accepting that the attack originated within its borders, but attributing it 
to a criminal hacker rather than the state itself, for which the state is not re-
sponsible.  Cyberspace gives states a unique ability to undertake interventions 
in another state’s affairs that go beyond sanctions but fall below use of force 
without the high costs that used to be imposed on traditional espionage.46 It 
gives the same ability in space and has the added benefit of interfering with a 
space object without creating unnecessary debris.  Further, one could certainly 
envision that such an attack could be deployed against an entire constellation 
at once, which could be extraordinarily disruptive.
C. VERY LARGE CONSTELLATIONS
Finally, very large constellations are an innovation that relies on small sat-
ellite technology and reduced launch costs.  These constellations are built on 
the theory that it can be cheaper to place a large constellation of smallsats in 
low earth orbit and replace them on an as-needed basis than to build larger sat-
ellites that are meant to stay in orbit for more than a decade.   One of the added 
advantages to this model is that the satellites can be updated in the manufac-
turing process to add or improve capabilities and to patch onboard software. 
45 See generally David D. Clark and Susan Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” in Proceedings of a Work-
shop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, National 
Research Council (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010) and Collin S. Allan, “Attribu-
tion Issues in Cyberspace,” Chicago-Kent Journal of International & Comparative Law 13 (2013): 55–83.
46 See generally P.J. Blount, Reprogramming the World: Cyberspace and the Geography of Global Or-
der, Chap. 6. (e-International Relations Press, 2019) https://www.e-ir.info/publication/reprogramming-the-
world-cyberspace-and-the-geography-of-global-order/s
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Very large constellations have two effects.  First, they add a lot of noise to the 
data on what is a normal behavior in space.  If the trend towards this economic 
model of space operations continues it might be very likely to see numerous 
very large constellation operating.  This means that it could become much 
less suspicious if militaries begin to experiment with such technologies.  The 
second effect is that this economic model presents the opportunity to create 
space weapons systems that have global coverage, which to date has been too 
expensive to be considered feasible.  Any such system would be limited by 
the small size of the satellites needed to make such a constellation tenable in 
terms of launch costs, but the rise of the technology may breathe new hope 
into adherents of space-based missile defense systems.
These are, of course, not the only emerging technologies for space that 
have military applications, but they are representative of how new technolo-
gies can undermine the assumptions that underpin security environments.  In 
these cases, what is observable is that these new technologies present specific 
military uses that challenge the status quo.  Peaceful purposes, as understood 
by states during the Cold War, was bounded by the technological assumptions 
that these new technologies cause to shift.  Such shifts have implications for 
legal terms that are filled with political content, and states may adopt new 
interpretations of norms in light of changed circumstances. 
V. CONCLUSION
While there are currently shifts happening in state interpretation of the 
obligation to use space for peaceful purposes, it is unclear as to whether the 
point of no return has been crossed.  Arguably, states still have the opportunity 
to pursue both political frameworks and legal frameworks for the limitation 
of space to peaceful purposes as understood at the time of the adoption of the 
Outer Space Treaty.  Projects such as the UNCOPUOS’s Long Term Sustain-
ability Guidelines are valuable contributions to space security, but without 
direct action and good faith negotiations on issues directly related to space 
security, it is unlikely that true progress will be made at preserving the stabil-
ity created by the eroding ideal of peaceful purposes.47  It currently seems as 
if the major space players are actively trying to thwart, stall, and avoid any 
such talks or negotiations. This situation is likely to continue as global order 
continues to jostle in the post-Cold War Information Age.  
This is an unfortunate situation as the stakes are high.  Once a weapon is 
47  Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/74/20,  para. 163 and annex 
II (June 20 2019).
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deployed in space it is likely that more will follow, and once that threshold is 
crossed, then it will be very difficult to roll back.  This is one of the reasons 
that contemporary rhetoric such as that used by President Trump when dis-
cussing the space force and that used by President Modi when discussing Op-
eration Shakti can be so disturbing to space security. These are read as signals 
within the international community, and the signal that is being rendered is a 
replacement of space prominence through a civil space program with space 
dominance through a military program.  This is the exact opposite of the tact 
taken at the beginning of the Space Age to link space exploration to the idea of 
peaceful purposes.  At the beginning of the Space Age, it was quickly seen that 
basing the use and exploration of space on a broad understanding of peaceful 
purposes was the best way to divorce space from its potential to result in Cold 
War conflict.  Sixty years later we are witnessing a retreat from this value that 
will likely be fueled by technological innovation. Until  the major spacefaring 
states are willing to discuss the various possibilities of limiting the weaponiza-
tion of space, the legal content of peaceful purposes will continue to erode one 
ASAT test at a time.
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